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KURDISH IDENTITY AND SPORTS IN TURKEY: 
THE CASE OF AMEDSPOR
Abstract: The Kurds, the largest minority in Turkey, have almost no visibility in Turkish 
sports. While Kurdish sportspeople are not discouraged from joining sport activities, their 
participation is heavily monitored by the government agencies against any manifestation of 
ethnic identity. Football in Kurdish regions, seen by the Turkish state as a tool to distract 
Kurdish youth from political activities, has always been subjected to the direct intervention of 
the civil and military bureaucracy, their presence in club boards is not uncommon. However, 
a third-division club, named Amedspor, challenged all the unwritten rules related to Kurds in 
sport, at the expense of receiving recurring suspension from the Turkish Football Federation. 
This article examines Kurdish sport and the Amedspor case through Manuel Castells’ concep-
tion of legitimizing, resistance and project identities.
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Introduction    
The Kurds in Turkey have a unique situation as a minority, since they are con-
sidered to be a “founding component” of the Turkish Republic, in a similar 
status with the Turks, in the official discourse; however there is a century-long 
history of them being deprived from social, political and cultural rights (Cizre 
Sakallıoğlu 1996: 8). Since the 1980s, there has been a violent conflict between 
the Turkish state and the Kurdish political movement, having resulted in the 
deaths of soldiers, guerrillas and thousands of civilians. After a failed negotia-
tion process between two parties in 2009-2015, the Kurdish-Turkish issue has 
reached a new bloody climax as the Turkish government led by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan embraced an ultra-nationalistic and openly anti-Kurdish stance (Öz-
pek 2018: 55) that led to the imprisonment of thousands of Kurdish politicians, 
journalists and lawyers, and also helped Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Par-
ty (AKP) to form an alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP) to keep itself over the 50% threshold in the upcoming presiden-
tial ballot that would practically open Erdoğan the gates of a one-man rule. 
Especially after the failed coup d’etat of July 2016 that had no ties whatsoever 
to the Kurdish Political Movement (KPM), the AKP government used the State 
of Emergency declared right after the coup to suppress the Kurdish political 
institutions and the Kurdish civil society in general. (Celep 2018: 20-21) 
Kurdish sports had its share of the increasingly autocratic political climate of 
Turkey, as the elected mayors of Kurdish towns of the Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP – the legal representative of the Kurdish political movement in the region), 
who were providing financial support to local clubs, have been mostly arrested 
and one by one replaced by government-appointed trustees. (Celep 2018: 21) 
As most clubs are tied to the municipalities, their financial flow went into direct 
government control. Also, two local clubs 73 Cizrespor and Şırnak Belediye Spor 
Kulübü were shut down by government decrees in January 2017. 
Among the Kurdish clubs, Amedspor, former club of the Diyarbakır munici-
pality run by the BDP (renamed later to DBP, Democratic Regions’ Party), is a 
noteworthy example. After the 2. lig (third division) club Diyarbakır Büyükşe-
hir Belediyespor (the municipality club) changed its name to Kurdish name 
of the city (Amed) and colors to Kurdish national colors, it started receiving 
penalties and suspensions in weekly basis from the Turkish Football Federation 
(TFF), its fans were frequently blocked from the away games and its star play-
er, former St. Pauli forward, Deniz Naki was suspended from football for life 
and put in trial for “supporting terrorism.” Despite severe pressure, Amedspor 
played in the quarter finals of the Turkish Cup in the 2015-16 season and pulled 
a surprise 3-3 draw against Fenerbahçe at home, and in 2016-17, came close 
to be promoted to the Second Division (1.Lig). The club’s women’s section was 
also promoted to the top division of the Turkish women’s football leagues. 
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In this article, we will try to analyze the Kurdish sports in Turkey and the 
Amedspor case through the dichotomy of identities conceptualized by Manuel 
Castells, based on forms and origins of identity building; namely legitimizing, 
resistance and project identities (2010:8), through the historical course of events 
concerning the Kurdish political movement, as well as the Kurdish football. The 
legitimizing identity is introduced by the dominant institution of society, the 
resistance identity is created by the dominated to contest the dominating power, 
and the project identity aims to redefine the position of the concerned actors in 
society. (Castells 2010:8)
The Kurdish Question: legitimizing, resistance and pro-
ject identities
Castells’ proposed distinction on identity building investigates the appearance 
of different identities in social actors in three different categories that generate 
different types of social structures. The legitimizing identity, which is “intro-
duced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their 
domination vis à vis social actors,” according to Castells, generates a civil soci-
ety comprised of different organizations and institutions, “as well as a series of 
structured and organized social actors.” (Castells 2010:8) Castells (2010: 70) 
argues that this type of identities is in crisis, since the civil society of the indus-
trial era and the nation-states tend to disintegrate, in the network society. This 
argument is more open to discussion that the period that it was claimed, since 
it seems now possible that nation-states in the network society era may be able 
to reproduced in a global context, as right-wing populism that considers people 
as nations has successfully adapted itself to the new communication strategies 
of the network society (Ernst et al. 2017:12), as in the use of social media plat-
forms that “allow people to communicate their identity beyond the immediate 
range of social interactions, and, therefore, in a more selective and stylized man-
ner.” (Krämer 2017:10) In our case, the domination of the Turkish state over 
its Kurdish citizens with its institutions and imposed identity is ever-present. It 
may be argued that the failed peace negotiation process of the early 2010s might 
have been affected by Turkey’s loosening from its confinement of its state-centric 
nationalism triggered by the globalization and the country’s accession process to 
the European Union. (Keyman 2016:77-78) However, it should be also noted 
that the peace process that could have been of vital importance in the history of 
Turkey was merely dispensable for Erdoğan, since he decided to end the process 
and take a hard line of populist ultra-nationalism with heavy anti-Kurdish and 
militaristic undertones, mostly to “win back the support that it had lost to the 
MHP [Nationalist Action Party] in the June 2015 elections. (Sayarı 2016: 272) 
The vulnerability of the peace process and less nationalistic official policies came 
from the durability of Turkey’s century-long practices of creating and preserving 
dominant institutions to extend and consolidate its domination. It may also be 
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claimed that Erdoğan’s twist to the right-wing populism, that he embraced after 
he completely lost his credibility vis-à-vis Europe after the brutal repression of 
the mass protests in 2013, and he was openly contested in domestic politics by 
the Kurdish leadership, is in line with the rise of the right-wing populism in 
Europe which aims to disrupt the European democratic institutions and put the 
idea of democracy itself under question. Therefore, Turkey’s imposing a legiti-
mizing identity to the Kurds, except a brief period that resulted in utter failure, 
is not curbed by the rise of the network society; it has been slightly altered. 
The legitimizing identity imposed by the Turkish state to the Kurds, despite 
marginally changing from time to time, entails denouncing all sorts of identity 
politics and the claims of cultural and political rights other than offered by the 
Turkish state. In other words, Kurds in Turkey are free to live as Kurds privately, as 
long as they accept to be Turks publicly, under the imposed non-negotiable condi-
tions that define the set of rights and liberties that the Kurds are entitled to, which 
may will be lesser than those given to ethnic Turks. Navaro-Yashin (2002:53) 
claims that hostility towards Kurds’ cultural claims is shared notably by the secu-
larist Turks who believe that “the Turkish state was created for them.” It is interest-
ing that Islamist Erdoğan’s switch to anti-Kurd nationalism with a similar hostility 
that had also been used against the Islamists for decades is fully embraced by his 
electoral base. This may be explained by the Islamists’ new-found penchant to use 
the traditional weapons of the state that they have taken over, as well as the KPM 
being the only political power that can tip the scales against the AKP’s favors, as 
the HDP did in the June 2015 elections which almost cost the AKP the govern-
ment and was immediately followed by the military operations against Kurds and 
mass incarcerations of the HDP and the BDP members.  
This hostile feeling against Kurds is fuelled by the dominant official and so-
cial perceptions of Kurds in Turkey; which have included logic that justify as-
similation considering Kurds as “future Turks” (Ergin 2014:327), “pseudo-citi-
zens” (Yegen 2009: 610-612), or “exclusive recognition… [that] targets Kurdish 
migrants exclusively” (Saracoğlu 2009: 642-643) which recognizes the Kurds as 
the “recognized other… distinguished by negative traits” (ibid.: 642). Therefore, 
the Kurds, with or without accepting the norms imposed to them are prone to 
be excluded, which inevitably brings out the second form of identity building, 
according to Castells’ conception, the resistance identities. 
The resistance identity is “generated by those actors who are in positions/con-
ditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building 
trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or op-
posed to, those permeating the institutions of society.” (Castells op.cit.:7) Castells 
depends on Calhoun while formulating this identity, who in turn defines identity 
through the “interrelated problems of self-recognition and recognition by others.” 
(Calhoun 1994: 20) According to Calhoun, identity politics that stem from these 
problems are political, “because they involve refusing, diminishing or displacing 
identities others wish to recognize in individuals.” (Calhoun 1994: 21) 
Historically, since the emergence of the KPM in the 1960s as a component of 
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the popular radical-left movements of the era, it has always represented a resist-
ance identity in multiple degrees. According to Bozarslan, behind the rebirth of 
Kurdish nationalism in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, there was the exper-
iment in political pluralism, “a relatively little known combination of collective 
memory and a tradition of rebelliousness,” and the new Kurdish intelligentsia 
influenced by left-wing politics. (1992: 75) Yavuz (2001: 9-10) argues that the 
movement appeared as an attempt to secularize the Kurdish question which had 
been traditionally tied to the religious identities and leaderships, depending on 
“the right of nations to self-determination,” a discussion originally started by 
Lenin in Marxist circles in 1914, to take the Kurdish Question into the agenda 
of the left-wing politics in Turkey. The affinity of the Kurdish intellectuals of the 
1960s and the 1970s to Marxism and modernism in general, inevitably created 
a tense relationship with the religious elders, comparable to the relationship 
between the pioneers of the Greek enlightenment in the early 19th century and 
the Greek-Orthodox religious leadership. In a way, it was the Kurdish enlight-
enment that started, embracing a resistance identity against the old social struc-
tures and leaderships of the Kurds. 
The oppression against the Kurdish identity after the 1980 coup reinforced a 
higher layer of resistance identity, against the Turkish state. This identity rapid-
ly rose to prominence as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) led by Abdullah 
Öcalan, a former Ankara University student and leftist militant of the 1970s, 
launched an armed campaign against Turkish military and civilian targets. As 
the war between the PKK and the Turkish Army escalated, the repression over 
the Kurdish people was aggravated, led to village displacements and a wave 
of Kurds taking shelter in Turkish cities, which triggered permanent collective 
memories in Kurds (van Bruinessen 2005: 51), as well as a daily dose of social 
exclusion in the places that they migrated. All these resulted in a more identi-
ty-conscious generation which embraced the resistance identity to survive.  Van 
Bruinessen confirms this inference while explaining the growing popularity of 
the PKK among Kurds at that period; “The armed conflict has increased the 
Kurds’ awareness of their distinct ethnic identity and caused an acute sense of 
being regarded as second-class citizens at best. Since all moderate spokespersons 
for the Kurds have been treated with scorn or have been jailed by the authori-
ties, many have come to see the PKK as the only force that can represent them” 
(1998: 49). The PKK’s role as the representative of the Kurdish resistance identi-
ty was later partially undertaken by a line of Kurdish political parties that found 
ways to circumvent political restrictions against the KPM to voice Kurdish con-
cerns in the Parliament. The BDP and the HDP are current political parties that 
represent the KPM respectively in local and national level. 
While the claims of the KPM have varied depending on the period, from 
independence, to equal citizenship, to democratic autonomy; since its begin-
ning, its core claim has been the recognition and the acceptance of the Kurdish 
identity by the Turkish state and society. As Calhoun (op.cit.: 21) states, identity 
politics are public and collective, “they involve seeking recognition, legitimacy 
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(and sometimes power), not only expression or autonomy; other people, groups 
and organizations (including states) are called upon to respond.” Therefore, the 
ultimate destination of all resistance identities, including the Kurdish one, may 
be considered to be a durable change in the current power structure of the social 
actors, which is conceptualized by Castells as the project identity.
Castells explains the project identity as; “when social actors, on the basis of 
whatever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that re-
defines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of 
overall social structure” (op.cit.: 7). For the Kurdish case, it may be debated 
when it transformed to a project identity, since it has had varying political claims 
through the course of time that demanded durable political status. However, in 
our view, the “Democratic Autonomy Project” that was first pronounced in the 
2007 congress of the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP, predecessor 
of the BDP-HDP) represents the transformation between the resistance identity 
and the project identity. The concept which had its roots in Abdullah Öcalan’s 
defence in court in 1999, was later introduced in 2005 as “democratic confeder-
alism” to the Kurdish political circles. (Gürer 2015: 59-60) Ersanlı and Bayhan’s 
analysis of the project reveals the transformation from the resistance identity to 
the project identity; “The perceptions of communities that claim the right to 
self-determination and especially those of intellectuals have changed regarding 
nations and states. As in Turkey and many other countries, not claiming a state 
(see the DTP, BDP leaflets and the DTK [Democratic Society Congress] draft 
text) is possible, and it is foreseeable that the welfare of the peoples may be reached 
by a stateless resolution, namely by autonomy.” (2012: 226-227) The difference 
of the “Democratic Autonomy Project” from previous political claims of the 
KPM is, as pertinent to the definition of the project identity, it aims to transform 
the entire social structure in Turkey (as it proposes autonomous regions all over 
the country), by redefining the Kurds’ position (giving them autonomy). The 
project, according to Akkaya and Jongerden, “involves an active agency in the 
form of a force of struggle” where “the state is not the main frame of reference in 
democratic confederalism, demands or expectations are not directed to the state, 
but shaped in the daily lives by people themselves.” (2013: 198-199) 
The “Democratic Autonomy Project” and the peace negotiations with the 
Turkish state may also be interpreted as the transformation of the legitimizing 
identity by a project identity. One might compare this project with other nation-
alist dilemmas; such as Britain-Scotland, Yugoslavia-Croatia or Iraq-Kurdistan. 
Nairn (2003: 204) classifies these dilemmas in two categories; “under-devel-
oped or pillaged regions that have finally begun to react against this treatment; 
and quite highly-developed epicentres of industrialization, middle-class cultures 
who are for one reason or another out of phase with the ruling nation-state, and 
want separate development to get ahead faster.” The Kurdish case in Turkey (as 
opposed to the Kurdish case in Iraq, according to Nairn (ibid)) is an example 
of the first category; the Kurdish regions in Turkey have been systematically 
impoverished, and the emergence of a Kurdish economic capital has been pre-
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vented by moves like the liquidation of Doğu Bank, the Kurdish bank, by a mil-
itary decree in 1960. (Bozarslan, op. cit.: 80) In these conditions, the Kurdish 
movement was reborn as a cultural-political movement in connection with the 
Turkish left (ibid.: 78-80), and then partly transformed into an armed struggle 
in the early 1980s. The secular-left Kurdish political movement, from the begin-
ning, contested the feudal structures in the region “who were considered to be 
as responsible as the Turkish bourgeoisie for problems faced by the community” 
(Bozarslan, op. cit.: 77-78). Therefore, in a setting without industrialization or a 
bourgeoisie but with an intelligentsia, the Kurdish political movement has been 
marked by a heavy emphasis on the ethno-cultural identity, which is needed to 
“translate regional economic disparities into a nationalist movement,” as Yavuz 
underlines. (op. cit.: 22) 
In regards to Amedspor, it is also important to note that the Amedspor name 
change and its appearance as an identity club took place in October 2014, af-
ter the democratic autonomy was presented as the “minimal prerequisite” in 
the BDP manifesto (Milliyet 23 January 2014) for the March 2014 elections 
where the BDP recorded a major victory in the Kurdish cities against the AKP 
candidates in the local elections of 2014, including the 55,1 to 35% victory in 
Diyarbakır. Even though, the name change cannot be directly associated with 
the project, it is also impossible to dissociate from it, since, as we will try to ar-
gue, the Amedspor project shares with the KPM similar objectives of a project 
identity in its own domain.  
Football clubs representing sub-state ethnic identities
Representation of sub-state ethnic identities through sports, especially football, 
is not a new phenomenon. It has worldwide-known examples such as Athlet-
ic Bilbao representing the Basques and FC Barcelona the Catalans in Spain, 
or less-known examples like the Arab football club in Israel or the Armenian 
clubs in Iran, such as FC Ararat Tehran. The relationships of sub-state nations’ 
football teams with the states they live under can be analysed through recogni-
tion; the way they relate themselves to the state, and the way the state relates 
to them, in a way overlapping Calhoun’s formulation of the role of recognition 
in identity formation.
Regarding the way minority ethnic clubs position themselves vis-a-vis the 
institutional structure imposed by the sovereign state; Sorek, working on Arab 
football teams in Israel, presents a very fruitful distinction of three ideal types 
of institutional strategies. According to the author (Sorek 2003: 426-427); the 
first type is the cultural distinction strategy, in which the group develops or 
adopts a particular sports field; the second type is structural separation, in which 
the group establishes its own governing bodies for sports; and the third type is 
intensive inclusion, which takes the most popular sports of the majority. As in 
most examples, like the Arab teams in Israel, minority teams in Sweden, Germa-
ny, Canada and Australia, or the Austrian teams in Nazi Germany; Amedspor 
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also represents the third type in which the Kurdish teams join Turkish football 
leagues to represent the sub-state ethnic identity. One reason for the third op-
tion to be popular may be the fact that competing in state competitions pro-
vide some kind of limited recognition which also constitute contestation. This 
contestation appears in two different aspects; sportively as representation also 
means challenging rival teams, and culturally as teams may display national or 
ethnic symbols and slogans. In the Amedspor example, both aspects are present; 
Amedspor’s away win against Bursaspor in front of notoriously ultra-national-
istic Bursa fans in the Turkish Cup is undeniably emblematic, as well as Amed 
fans chanting “children should not die, they should come to our matches” or 
“Resist Diyarbakır, Resist Amed” making references to the Turkish military op-
erations in Diyarbakır having resulted in dozens’ of civilian deaths. Even the 
use of the name Amed in the club’s name is a direct contestation of official state 
policies, as Turkish state and the nationalists consistently reject the use of Diyar-
bakır’s name in Kurdish language. 
In reference to Castells’ conception of identities, Spaaij and Viñas (2013: 
188) claim that the “(...) politics of contestation rests on the notion of diverse 
and oppositional value systems within football and involves a combination of 
resistance and project identities.” Therefore, the contestation manifested by the 
football clubs representing sub-state ethnic identities should be observed in re-
lation to resistance and project identities. 
A brief history of Kurdish football
The exact date of football’s arrival in the city of Diyarbakır remains to be un-
known. However, it is quite likely to have happened after the end of the Turkish 
War of Independence in 1923 and before the foundation of Ayspor club in 1930. 
The first record of national football in Diyarbakır is the inclusion of the city in the 
National Championship’s Mersin Round Robin games in 1932. (Yüce 2014: 251) 
In 1933, it is recorded that Ayspor reached the Diyarbakır city championship, 
beating Yıldızspor. As Yüce, the author of the most intensive sources on football 
in the 1930s in Turkey, underlines the names of two major clubs in Diyarbakır is 
striking, since Ay and Yıldız respectively mean “crescent” and “star,” the symbols 
of Turkish nationalism. (Yüce 2014: 263) As these clubs were evidently founded 
well before the establishment railway connection of Diyarbakır to the rest of the 
country in 1935, we may speculate with caution that both these clubs bearing 
symbols of Turkish nationalism may be founded at least by the encouragement of 
the military deployed in Diyarbakır. One other evidence supporting that claim is 
the other clubs joining the Diyarbakır City League in 1940-41; Kolordu (Army 
Corps), Tayyare (Airforce), and Muhabere (Communications) (ibid.: 380). Also, 
Yüce states that all the clubs joining the league in neighboring Maraş League in 
1944 are army teams. (ibid.: 417) Therefore, it is safe to say that football activities 
in the regions are pioneered by the military, however we are unable to say if this 
was simply some leisure activity for the army members or a policy to integrate the 
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region to the newly-founded republic. On the other hand, the latter option seems 
unlikely as individual athletic activities were prioritized over team sports at that 
period by the state, and football was not used to ensure national unity. As a matter 
of fact, football was feared to be a perturbation for Turkish nationalism because of 
the fierce rivalries it featured.
Professional football in Diyarbakır starts with the 1960s, like in most Ana-
tolian cities, as a result of an initiative led by Orhan Şeref Apak, the President 
of the TFF of the period. (Gökaçtı 2008: 222-226) It should be noted that this 
expansion of professional football to Anatolian cities is a consequence of Turk-
ish football’s transformation in the previous decade. In the 1950s, as full pro-
fessionalism was accepted, the neighborhood clubs of Istanbul, the grassroots of 
Turkish football were destined to financial collapse as they could not cope with 
the new demands of the football scene with their limited budgets and fan bases. 
Also, the removal of last remaining minority bourgeoisie by the deportation of 
Greek nationals and their (mostly Turkish national) families starting from the 
late 1950s was the death sentence of minority clubs such as Beyoğluspor, the 
successor of famous Pera Club which also gave birth to two major clubs, AEK 
and PAOK, in Greece. By the 1960s, football clubs except the “Three Giants” 
of Istanbul were insignificant details, which led to the collapse of the national 
team that was previously qualified for the World Cup in 1954. The expansion of 
professional football to provincial Anatolia and the establishment of lower divi-
sions was an obligation for football’s sustainability in Turkey. The TFF and the 
other state agencies handled this task with a pretty much hands-on approach, 
in cooperation with governors of the cities, mayors, bank managers or wealthy 
businesspeople. Diyarbakırspor’s story is not any different. The club was found-
ed in 1968, by Diyarbakır mayor Nejat Cemiloğlu’s efforts, and merging two 
most popular amateur clubs, Dicle Gençlik and Yıldız Spor. In Diyarbakırspor’s 
foundation, many prominent figures of the city joined their forces, and the club 
was embraced by the whole city. (Arhan 2001: 28) The club is an example of 
political and business elite cooperation in provincial football clubs, however 
unlike many examples in other cities usually dominated by the “Three Giants” 
regarding fan base, popular support for Diyarbakırspor is also present. 
It should also be noted that the foundation years of Diyarbakırspor coincide 
with the emergence of Kurdish intelligentsia who will generate the Kurdish Po-
litical Movement. In Diyarbakırspor’s early years, the KPM does not engage 
with the club despite its popularity. This reluctance can be explained by the left’s 
critical stance towards football in the 1970s in Turkey, of which the KPM was 
part of. According to Bostancıoğlu (2004: 242), the socialists in Turkey consid-
ered football to be a tool used for manipulating and stupefying the people. On 
the other hand, the increasing number of political murders in Diyarbakır in the 
late 1970s affected Diyarbakırspor, as the attention the club attracted decreased, 
despite its success in the First Division. (Arhan op.cit: 33) This period also led 
to an estrangement between the club and the city, as Turkish nationalist Çelebi 
Eser took over the club. This feeling that resulted in Diyarbakırspor being left 
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alone, further accelerated during the junta years after the 1980 coup d’état as 
the people of Diyarbakır and the members of the KPM were subject to severe 
torture, and football was hardly a priority. 
In 1999, the Kurdish question took a massive turn as the PKK leader Abdul-
lah Öcalan was captured in Kenya and brought to Turkey by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. Öcalan's declaration of “Democratic Republic Project” in capture re-
duced the armed clashes in Kurdish region, and both parties of the conflict 
changed strategies, shifting to non-violent struggle. The Turkish government 
aimed to reduce the KPM’s dominance in the region by taking some economic 
and social measures. Football, more precisely promoting Diyarbakırspor to the 
top division, appeared to be one of these measures. Gaffar Okkan, the police 
chief in the city led this initiative, also controlling the club by registering 700 
police officers to the club, thus holding a massive voting power inside Diyar-
bakırspor. (ibid.: 51) Okkan, a very popular figure in Diyarbakır due to his 
community-based approach, believed Diyarbakırspor’s promotion to the top di-
vision was a powerful tool to reduce the KPM’s influence in the city. His strate-
gy was also supported by the governors and the non-KPM MPs of the region. 
In January 2001, while Diyarbakırspor was on the verge of being promoted, 
Gaffar Okkan was assassinated at point-blank range, as well as five other police 
officers. The culprits were never founded and no political movement claimed 
responsibility to the murder, while Hezbollah was generally considered to be 
behind the assassination. After Okkan’s death, Diyarbakırspor’s promotion was 
perceived as a promise to the murdered police official, not only by the Diyar-
bakırspor fans but also the politicians nationwide. The club meanwhile won 
its games under shady conditions. The Altay playoff game, in which the TV 
broadcast was canceled, the opponent players were violently attacked in and 
off the pitch. The referees openly enabled Diyarbakırspor to win the game, and 
the referee observers graded the referees by 9/10. Intriguingly, all but one of 
the referees and observers appointed to the game were either military or police 
officers, while one observer Galip Bitigen had even served as a military officer in 
Diyarbakır for five years. (ibid.: 68)
The particularity of the situation of Kurds in Turkey regarding sports activ-
ities is that, they have never been actively discouraged by the Turkish state to 
be involved. On the contrary, as we tried to show, sports, especially football in 
the Kurdish regions, was considered by the civil and military bureaucracy as a 
way of depoliticizing the Kurdish youth and diverting them from the Kurdish 
political movement, especially from the PKK. Therefore, the leading civil and 
military bureaucratic actors in Kurdish cities played an important role in the rise 
of sports clubs in the region to prominence.
While the football in Turkey has always been under state and financial elites’ 
tight supervision, the control over the football scene in the Kurdish region of 
the country has been even more rigid. While the region’s teams were rarely 
represented in the top division, their occasional success almost always came 
when the teams were direct ruled by state officials. Apart from Diyarbakırspor, 
69SOCIETY REGISTER | ISSN 2544-5502 | DOI: 10.14746/sr | http://societyregister.eu/ 
DAĞHAN IRAK
Vanspor, in the 1990s, was promoted to the top division with huge support 
from governor Mahmut Yılbaş, who even tried to revoke relegation during his 
term in parliament to prevent team going back to the Second Division (Milliyet 
13 April 1998). State officials considered football in Kurdish regions to be an 
antidote against “terror,” a term very liberally used in Turkey against almost all 
ethnic political activities, other than Turks’. Therefore, even though Kurdish 
cities’ teams appeared in the Super League from time to time, their supporters 
had absolutely no chance of displaying their Kurdish identity in the stands. The 
only time their Kurdishness were remembered was when opponent fans treated 
them as if they were PKK members, like Bursaspor’s ultra-nationalist fans called 
Diyarbakırspor fans as such in 2009. This situation changed when the state 
officials considered sponsoring football teams against Kurdish separatist move-
ments to be a failure and withdrew from club boards in the late 2000s. Most 
teams faced bankruptcy, including Vanspor and Diyarbakırspor, and plummet-
ed into lower leagues. Meanwhile, the KPM-run municipalities in the region 
started to support the local teams. Their involvement in sports clubs triggered 
a very rapid politicization, as politically-engaged fans who were not into city 
teams before also embraced the new initiatives. 
The curious case of Amedspor
Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyespor (the team of the municipality in Diyar-
bakır) was one of the clubs sponsored by the KPM-run municipalities. In 1999, 
the Municipality of Diyarbakır was reclaimed by DEHAP (Democratic People’s 
Party) of the Kurdish Political Movement (KPM) by 50% of votes, and the team 
was affiliated to city’s water administration DİSKİ to provide financial support. 
In this period, the club regained recognition in Diyarbakır, alongside the city’s 
principal and state-endorsed club Diyarbakırspor. In 2014, during Turkish gov-
ernment’s “Kurdish opening,” a set of reforms including further cultural rights 
for minorities and the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue, the club changed 
its name to Amedspor, which was later amended officially as Amed Sportif (still 
commonly called Amedspor) since the TFF rejected the name citing a defunct 
amateur club with the same name. The club also attempted to use green-red-yel-
low, the colors of the KPM, as its official colors; but due to political challenges 
they settled with green-red-white, less controversial colors in Turkey, though 
being the colors of the Kurdistan flag. Meanwhile, in June 2015, the Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP, the representative of 
the KPM in non-Kurdish regions) launched a successful election campaign di-
rectly contesting Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s iron-hand presidency ambitions with 
the slogan “We won’t let you be the President,” acquiring 13,1% of votes na-
tionwide, exceeding comfortably both the national threshold and all previous 
election results of the KPM. The HDP appearing as a nationwide radical-left 
option against Erdoğan’s rule resulted in the “Kurdish opening” being discarded 
by the latter, and the government launched a series of military operations along 
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with month-long curfews resulting in dozens in civilian deaths (OHCHR 2017; 
İHD 2016; EuroMed Rights 2016). When Amedspor kicked off its historic 
2015-16 campaign which would take them to the quarter finals of the Turkish 
Cup against giants Fenerbahçe, the emblematic Suriçi neighborhood of the city 
was under siege, leaving many historical building in ruins. 
Table 1 – Suspensions and penalties given to Amedspor by the TFF between 2015-2018.
Date Actor Reason Suspension Penalty
10/01/2015 Coach Sertaç Küçükbayrak Unsportmanship 2 matches 6000 TL
10/08/2015 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
12/08/2015 Team Unsportmanship 2500 TL
17/09/2015 Player Sercan Özçelik Violence 2 matches 2000 TL
29/09/2015 Fans Ideological Propaganda 20000 TL
17/11/2015 Fans Swearing Warning
19/11/2015 Fans Ideological Propaganda 20000 TL
17/12/2015 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
17/12/2015 Fans Swearing Warning
29/12/2015 Fans Disorder 10000 TL
29/12/2015 Fans Ideological Propaganda 20000 TL
29/12/2015 Fans Swearing Warning
12/01/2016 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
12/01/2016 Fans Swearing 8000 TL
14/01/2016 Fans Ideological Propaganda 40000 TL
19/01/2016 Fans Disorder 1 match
19/01/2016 Fans Ideological Propaganda 40000 TL
19/01/2016 Fans Swearing 5000 TL
02/02/2016 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
02/02/2016 Fans Ideological Propaganda 1 match 20000 TL
02/02/2016 Fans Swearing Warning
16/02/2016 Team Unauthorized Banner 5000 TL
23/02/2016 Coach Faruk Türk Insulting the Referee 1 match 3000 TL
23/02/2016 Technical Director Harun Kılıç Insulting the Referee 3 matches 3000 TL
03/03/2016 Player Tekin Adar Violence 4 matches 6000 TL
02/04/2016 Player Deniz Naki Ideological Propaganda 12 matches 19500 TL
21/04/2016 Fans Disorder 7500 TL
21/04/2016 Fans Ideological Propaganda -3 points 40000 TL
21/04/2016 Fans Swearing 8000 TL
04/07/2016 Fans Swearing 4000 TL
03/08/2016 Board member Emrullah Gürbüz Disorder 50 days 10000 TL
03/08/2016 Team Unsportmanship 2100 TL
18/08/2016 Player Abdullah Çetin Unsportmanship 6 matches 13000 TL
29/09/2016 Club Security Measures 8000 TL
29/09/2016 Fans Swearing Warning
29/09/2016 Club Unauthorized Entry 13000 TL
11/10/2016 Fans Swearing 4000 TL
15/12/2016 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
15/12/2016 Player Deniz Naki Unsportmanship 4 matches 2100 TL
20/12/2016 Fans Ideological Propaganda 40000 TL
17/01/2017 Fans Swearing Warning
02/02/2017 Fans Disorder 10000 TL
23/02/2017 Team Unsportmanship 2100 TL
23/03/2017 Fans Disorder 15000 TL
23/03/2017 Club Security Measures 14000 TL
23/03/2017 Fans Swearing 12000 TL
23/03/2017 Club Unauthorized Entry 13000 TL
23/03/2017 Player Deniz Naki Unsportmanship 6 matches 7500 TL
20/04/2017 Fans Ideological Propaganda 40000 TL
20/04/2017 Club Security Measures 5000 TL
23/05/2017 Fans Disorder 15000 TL
23/05/2017 Fans Swearing 1 match 3000 TL
23/05/2017 Player Okan Dernek Violence 3 matches 1800 TL
21/09/2017 Team Unauthorized Apparel Warning
28/09/2017 Club Improper Equipment 5000 TL
28/09/2017 Club Improper Equipment 5000 TL
16/11/2017 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
16/11/2017 President Nurullah Edemen Insulting the Referee 3 months 30000 TL
23/11/2017 Fans Disorder 5000 TL
02/01/2018 Club Not playing the match -3 points
30/01/2018 Player Deniz Naki Ideological Propaganda Lifetime 273000 TL
15/03/2018 Fans Swearing Warning
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Simultaneously, after the government’s stance towards the Kurdish issue 
shifted to a nationalistic tone in 2015, Amedspor started to receive frequent 
suspensions from the TFF. In the 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18 seasons (un-
til April), Amedspor was penalized 63 times by the TFF for various reasons. 
Fans were penalized 37 times, and star forward Deniz Naki (with Bundesliga 
and Süper Lig experience, who is among the best players of the division) re-
ceived three suspensions of 12, 4 and 6 games respectively, before receiving a 
lifetime ban in January 2018, along with a record-breaking 273,000 Turkish 
Liras (65,000 USD) penalty for “ideological propaganda.”2 In the full tally of 
penalties and suspensions given to Amedspor by the TFF (Table 1), the “ideo-
logical propaganda” penalties are exceptionally important. Amedspor were giv-
en this penalty 9 times as a club, along worth of a total pecuniary punishment 
of 280,000 Turkish Liras (67,000 USD, an important sum for a third division 
club), one match suspension and 3-point penalty. Deniz Naki was given this 
penalty twice, resulting in a 12-match suspension and 292,500 Turkish Liras 
pecuniary punishment.
If one has to take a look at the use of this “ideological propaganda” ban by the 
TFF, it will become apparent that this rule was applied exclusively against Kurd-
ish clubs. Apart from Amedspor; Dersimspor, Van Büyükşehir Belediyespor 
(KPM-run municipality club), Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyespor (KPM-run 
municipality club, former name of Amedspor), Cizrespor and Diyarbekirspor 
are the clubs having received this penalty. Meanwhile, the pro-government or 
anti-government slogans in the Istanbul stadiums, or the ultra-nationalistic slo-
gans against the Kurdish teams never received this penalty. Even though it is not 
uncommon to see that anti-government or overtly racist slogans are penalized, 
they are usually handled under the “crowd disorder” category. Therefore, it is 
evident that the “ideological propaganda” penalty, which has been in place since 
2014, is only applied to the pro-Kurdish expressions in the stadiums. In a rare 
detailed explanation of the “ideological propaganda” penalty, the TFF stated 
in February 2016 that they penalized the “The barricade is here to stay; Every-
where is Sur, resistance is everywhere; Everywhere is Cizre, resistance is every-
where; Children should not die, they should come see our matches” slogans 
chanted by Amedspor fans. 
Along with these suspensions and penalties, Amedspor fans often received 
away game bans for “security measures.”  According to sports columnist Nilay 
Yılmaz, fans born in Kurdish cities were banned from the Istanbulspor-Amed-
spor game in Istanbul in February 2017, and Amed fans were banned from 
away games in consecutive 26 weeks at that period. (Yılmaz 2017) 
As of April 2018, Amedspor is trying to survive from relegation in Lig B. It 
continues to receive suspensions which create a financial burden, it has lost its 
star player, it is routinely deprived from away support. Also, after the Diyar-
bakır Metropolitan Municipality was taken over by the trustee appointed by 
2 The suspensions are listed on tff.org
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the Turkish government replacing the imprisoned elected officials in November 
2016, the trustee demanded Amedspor to change its name and take government 
appointed municipality officials in the club board in order to continue receiving 
financial support from the municipality, however the club rejected both changes 
in early 2017 (Gazete Duvar 2017). In March 2018, the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs sent three inspectors to the club for thorough investigation, while the 
reason for the investigation was not declared to the club board. 
Discussion
It can be said that the participation of the Kurds in sports activities in Turkey 
happens almost exclusively under the legitimizing identity attributed to them 
by the Turkish state, which is being Turkish citizens and in some cases a pros-
pect or member of the Turkish national team. As long as their activities remain 
within the borders of this identity, it is not curbed, even encouraged. The World 
Youth Champion athlete Mizgin Ay, born in Batman, is a prime example of the 
use of this legitimizing identity. Mizgin Ay is a daughter of a Kurdish seasonal 
agricultural worker who was sponsored by the local authorities in Ankara where 
the family migrated. While Ay is Kurdish, her Kurdish identity is rarely visible 
whereas she is seen in press with the Turkish flag, almost without an exception. 
In the press interviews of Ay that we examined, only the Deutsche Welle (2017) 
interview mentioned that she is Kurdish, while the interviews in Turkish dailies 
mentioned the support of the Turkish officials (Hürriyet 26 July 2017; sozcu.
com.tr 2017), her pride for the Turkish flag and national anthem (sozcu.com.
tr 2017; Hürriyet 26 July 2017) and her homage to the slain Turkish soldiers 
(Habertürk 15 July 2017). 
Meanwhile, the position of Amedspor in the identity scheme of Castells is up 
for debate. It is clear that the club, using a Kurdish name and Kurdish national 
colors, represents a resistance identity, openly contesting unwritten rules of Turk-
ish sports, forcing the governing bodies to officially take action. Amedspor, while 
negotiating with governing sports bodies regarding its name and colors, did not 
succumb to embracing the legitimizing identity and continued to challenge the 
norms imposed by the Turkish state, the dominant power. Whereas its success 
was heavily curbed by suspensions and penalties, it has continued to exist in 
terms that entails a resistance identity. Also, after the Diyarbakır Metropolitan 
Municipality was taken over by the trustee appointed by the Turkish government 
replacing the imprisoned elected officials in November 2016, the trustee de-
manded Amedspor to change its name and take government appointed munici-
pality officials in the club board in order to continue receiving financial support 
from the municipality, however the club rejected both changes in early 2017. 
On the other hand, the Amedspor case can be analyzed within the frames of 
the project identity. While the identity that the club projects can be considered 
to be a resistance identity, its existence in its own terms evidently aims to change 
the position of Kurds in society. It should be noted that Amedspor is one of the 
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very few examples that managed to exist in the popular culture world of Turkey 
without being forced to denounce its Kurdishness while it is being displayed 
as a resistance identity. The other example that comes to mind is the legendary 
singer Ahmet Kaya, who became a symbol of Kurdish political expression in the 
1990s and later assaulted by his peers in an award ceremony and was self-exiled 
in Paris where he died in 2000. Even though there have been many other Kurd-
ish singers in the mainstream music market, Kaya was the only one to display 
his Kurdishness as a resistance identity. While the case of Amedspor is compa-
rable to that of Ahmet Kaya, it should be underlined that Ahmet Kaya mostly 
challenged unwritten rules individually while Amedspor also had to challenge 
some written ones, in a period when other written rules were challenged by the 
Kurdish political movement. Therefore, in our view, the Amedspor case is closer 
to be an example of project identity, since it has not only contested the identi-
ties imposed to it, but tried to set a precedent to other Kurdish institutions that 
would aim to make a dent in the set of rules restricting the visibility of Kurd-
ishness in the social, cultural and political life of Turkey. This strategy may be 
compared to the admission of the Palestinian Football Federation by the FIFA 
in June 1998, which even predates the right to participate in general debate of 
Palestine in the United Nations. As in the Palestine example, the Amedspor case 
is logically tied to the greater political strategy, which is the “Democratic Au-
tonomy Project” in this example. Therefore, the identity displayed by Amedspor 
without taking the political and legal contexts in account may be considered to 
be a resistance identity, while its role in challenging the status imposed to the 
Kurds by the Turkish state corresponds to a project identity.
A long-time strategy of the Turkish state vis-à-vis Kurdish sports has been en-
couraging the Kurdish youth to be involved in sports activities, as long as these 
activities are heavily monitored or even run by the state institutions, giving abso-
lutely no space to any manifestation of the Kurdish identity. On the contrary, the 
activities are often associated with the Turkish army or the governorships under 
a heavy dose of Turkish national signs in display, as in the case of Mizgin Ay. In 
other words, Kurds are free to play as long as they do not play as Kurds. The legit-
imizing identity imposed by the Turkish state and society to the Kurds leaves very 
little room for recognition. In sports, this space is even narrower, all sportspeople 
are candidates for representing Turkey; an athlete like Ay should be a Turkish 
champion, her Kurdishness is irrelevant, even harmful to the sports’ function of 
generating national pride. Amedspor, meanwhile, appears to be a direct contesta-
tion of the legitimizing identity, as while its existence is a combination of resist-
ance and project identities. Politically, the relationship between Amedspor and 
the football’s governing bodies is in line with the conflict between the Turkish 
state and the KPM, or the Turkish society and the Kurdish identity. 
Popular culture, especially sports, is an overlooked, and often undermined 
field in scholarly research. However, more often than not, it plays an important 
role in identity building in underrepresented communities. In the Kurdish case, 
football is one of the first and few attempts of giving the resistance identity 
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mainstream visibility. In a setting where the use of Kurdish names and tradi-
tional colours have been criminalized and/or prohibited, Amedspor emerged 
as a direct challenger of the society’s written and unwritten rules regarding the 
Kurds, in a vastly popular area like football which has been historically dom-
inated by nationalism in Turkey. The use of football as resistance identity has 
been a recurring theme in Turkey, as the Gezi Protests in 2013 were marked by 
the participation of thousands of Stambulite football fans. The Amedspor case, 
differing from the latter, also offers, at least, the hints of a project identity that 
aims to change the rules regarding the Kurds in football, and partly in general. 
Meanwhile, the emergence of this resistance identity in football is also linked 
to the later failed peace negotiations between the Kurds and the Turkish state, 
therefore it appears in a period where the legitimizing identity imposed by Tur-
key to the Kurds was being shifted by a project identity, based on the Democrat-
ic Autonomy Project. The Amedspor case is a very particular example, since it 
is a football club that emerged representing a resistance identity during a period 
when the actors controlling legitimizing and project identities were holding 
formal negotiations. Furthermore, the club continued to represent the resist-
ance identity after the negotiations ended, while both the legitimizing identity 
and the project identity went through major transformations as the military 
conflict restarted. Therefore, even though it seems that the fate of Amedspor is 
completely linked to the peace negotiations, the club continued to exist, albeit 
in more difficult conditions, after the peace process failed, as football continued 
to be meaningful for the Kurdish population in the city. In that regard, in our 
opinion, it is important to conduct further research on the autonomous charac-
teristics of popular culture items representing resistance identities with respect 
to other, more dominant, types of identities. 
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